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LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS ACTTVITIES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
ELSPETH REID*
I. TWO BALLOONS
HOT air ballooning is a dangerous activity, and not only for the balloonist.
In Guille v. Swan,1 a balloonist crash-landed in a New York vegetable
garden. When a crowd rushed to his assistance damage was caused to the
vegetables. He was held to be strictly liable for the damage caused. Across
the Atlantic balloonists were more glamorous although not more
successful. In Scott's Trs. v. Moss,2 the defender, an Edinburgh impre-
sario, arranged a balloon flight by the "world-renowned scientific
aeronaut", Professor Baldwin. The advertisement promised that the
Professor would descend by parachute, landing on ground rented by the
defender. In the event, he missed and landed in a turnip field owned by
the pursuers. Fences and a large number of turnips were trampled by the
crowd rushing to the scene. The Court of Session decided that the
defender could be liable only on the basis of fault. Foreseeability was of
the essence: the pursuer was entitled to damages if and only if the crowd's
actions were the "natural and probable consequence" of the defender's
activities. Counsel's research had uncovered Guille v. Swan, but the Court
of Session declined to follow it into strict liability.
These two cases involve similar consequences arising from the same
hazardous activity. But the approach adopted by the court is, or appears
to be, rather different. These differences are the subject of this article.
II. DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES: SOME PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
LEGAL systems respond in different ways to the challenge of dangerous
activities. Some favour strict liability. Others do no more than apply the
normal rules of fault-based liability, on the view that an injured party does
not much care whether the damage was caused by an object recognised to
be dangerous or by one which is normally harmless.3 Indeed it has been
• Lecturer in Private Law, University of Edinburgh.
1. 19 Johns. 381 N.Y. (1822).
2. (1889) 17 R32.
3. That is the view taken, for example, in France. See case commentary on Dlte Counois
c Dame Faurie by J. Carbonnier, Receuil Dalloz Sirey (1985) J. 20. See also J. Carbonnier,
Droil civil: 4, Les obligations (11th edn, 1982), para.107; Starck, Roland and Boyer,
Obligations: 1. Rcsponsabilitt diliauellc (5th edn, 1996), paras.428-430.
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said that "the latter, if anything, seems the more dangerous of the two; it is
a wolf in sheep's clothing instead of an obvious wolf".4
There are also intermediate possibilities. Some systems temper fault-
based liability with the rule that, if an activity is abnormally dangerous,
negligence on the part of an independent contractor transfers to the
person on whose behalf the activity is being conducted.5 Virtually all
systems make special provision for the outrageously risky, such as the
generation of nuclear energy.6
These different models are explored later. But first there is a
preliminary issue of definition. A legal system which makes special
provision for the abnormally dangerous must find some means of
explaining what it has in mind. Comparative law suggests three broad
approaches.
A. Exhaustive enumeration
In German law strict liability is imposed in relation to specific hazards by
separate statute, normally with a financial limit on the amount recover-
able. The Liability Act of 1978, for example, imposes strict liability for
property damage and personal injuries caused on the railway network,
and by gas, electricity and water installations. Other statutes provide for
harm caused by aircraft,7 by nuclear installations,8 by the use of certain
medicines,' and for damage to the environment10 The Road Traffic Act of
1952 provides for strict liability in respect of road traffic accidents. There
is no general liability for dangerous activities, and the civil code is silent on
the subject.
A similar approach is taken in France. Statutory no-fault liability arises
in respect of a number of specific dangerous activities, for example
infection with HIV by contaminated blood transfusions,11 harm caused by
emissions from nuclear installations,12 and maritime pollution by hydro-
carbons.13 The Loi Badinter of 1985 provides for strict liability in relation
4. Hodge & Sonsy. Anglo American Oil Co. (1922), 12Ll.I_Rep. 183/wScnittonLJat
187. This remark was used by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C 562,
595-596 as an argument against the creation of a separate category of liability for dangerous
things.
5. This is the doctrine of non-delegable duties of care, discussed in pt VI below.
6. E.g. the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (UK), (see Blue Circle Industries Pic v.
Ministry of Defence [1998] 3 AU E.R. 385).
7. Air Traffic Act 1936.
8. Atomic Energy Act 1959.
9. Medicines Act 1976. Liability cannot be limited.
10. Environmental Liability Act 1990.
11. Law no. 91-1406 of 31 Dec 1991, Art.47.
12. Law no. 95-955 of 12 Nov. 1965 and Law no. 68-943 of 30 Oct. 1968 as amended by
Law no. 9CW88 of 16 June 1990.
13. Law no.77-530 of 26 May 1977.
OCTOBER 1999] Liability for Dangerous Activities 733
to road accidents.14 Departing from the German model, Article 1384.1 of
the Code Civil, discussed later,15 creates a presumption of liability for any
harm caused by things, but this is not restricted to things which are
inherently dangerous.
B. Non-exhaustive enumeration
Sometimes the list of dangerous activities is no more than explicative of a
general principle, so that other examples are possible. This is the
technique used in the Russian Federation Civil Code, which is one of the
most recent codes as well as the role model for other countries of the
former Soviet Union. Article 1079 sets out a non-exhaustive list of
dangerous activities." There is strict liability for activities which create
danger by the use of transport, mechanical things, high voltage electric
power, atomic power, explosives, or noxious poisons, or by construction
and other related works. Hot air ballooning is presumably an example of
transport. Parallel to the Code provisions, various statutes provide for
strict liability in particular contexts. The 1991 R.S.F.S.R. law "On the
Protection of the Environment", for example, provides for strict liability
for injury or property damage suffered as a result of activities which have
an unfavourable impact on the environment.17
The same technique is found elsewhere, for example in the Civil Code
of Spain. 18In the European Convention on Civil Liability for Damage
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (the "Lugano
Convention") the terms "dangerous activity" and "dangerous substance"
are defined by reference to detailed lists.19
C. General words
English law resorts to general words. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher20
imposes strict liability if a proprietor accumulates dangerous substances
which escape from his land and cause damage to other property. The
category of substance subject to the rule comprises, quite simply,
14. Law DO.85-677 of 5 July 1985, (Loi Badinter). See A. Tune "The Loi Badimer. Ten
Years of Experience" (1996) 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
329-340.
15. InptlV.
16. Art. 1079 meets the criticism of its Soviet predecessor. Fundamental Principles of
Civil Legislation Art. 90, which did not attempt a definition of such activities.
17. Arts 89-90.
18. Art 1908 imposes liability for damage caused by explosives, excessive smoke, and
falling trees.
19. Art 2. For the text of the Lugano Convention, see 1993 Yearbook of International
Environmental Law, pp.691-712. The Convention has been signed only by Cyprus, Finland,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
20. (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 265; affd. (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
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anything "likely to do mischief if it escapes".21 Rylands v. Fletcher itself
concerned the escape of water artificially accumulated in a reservoir.
However, the rule has over the years been taken to apply to damage
caused by the escape of a wide range of substances, including gas,22
sewage,23 explosives,24 and, more fancifully, aberrant fairground machin-
ery,23 yew tree clippings,26 and even persons likely to cause disturbance if
let loose.27 The cases contain little analysis of which objects or substances
are "likely to cause mischief, such propensities perhaps being taken for
granted in the context of the damage caused.
Suggestions have made for reform of the rule in England, most notably
by the Pearson Commission, which advocated strict liability for the
controllers of things or operations:
which by their unusually hazardous nature require close, careful and skilled
supervision, the failure of which may cause death or personal injury; and,
secondly, those which, although abnormally by their nature perfectly safe,
are likely, if they do go wrong, to cause serious and extensive casualties.2*
The suggestion did not prosper.29
The Rylands v. Fletcher rule spread to the United States where, even
before 1868, the courts had recognised strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities such as the use of dynamite and other explosives. But
while Rylands v. Fletcher was accepted in some States,30 it was rejected
almost as quickly in others,31 due in part to the hazardous nature of
enterprises routinely found in a frontier society. A new beginning was
made with the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts completed in
21. The rule approved by the House of Lords, was stated by Blackburn J in the Court of
Exchequer Chamber at 279: "We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for
his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
22. Northwestern Utilities Ltd v. London Guarantee Co. [1936] A . C 108.
23. Humphries v. Cousins (1877) 2 CP.D. 239.
24. Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd [1921] 2 A.C. 465.
25. Hale v. Jennings Bros [1938] 1 All E.R. 579.
26. Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board (1878) 4 Ex.D. 5.
27. A-G v. Corke [1933] Ch.89.
28. Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury Cmnd. 7054 (1978), para.l64Z
29. For earlier attempts at law reform in the UK, see Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform
Committee for Scotland Cmnd. 2348 (1964), and Civ'd Liability for Dangerous Things (1970,
Law Com. No32).
30. Ball v. Nye 99 Massachusetts 582 (1868); Cahill v. Eastman 18 Minnesota 324 (1871).
31. Brown v. Collins 53 New Hampshire 442 (1873); see also Losee v. Buchanan 51 New
York 476 (1873), 484-485, in which the view was expressed that the community should
accept exposure to hazard, in that case an exploding boiler, for the sake of industrial
progress.
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1977.32 This imposes strict liability in respect of abnormally dangerous
activities; and such activities are defined by means of a detailed
enumeration of their characteristics. Paragraph 520 of the Restatement is
as follows:
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be gTeat;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
Paragraph 520 allows objective risk factors to be set against (in factor
(f)) the social utility of the enterprise in question. Not all of the risk
factors need be satisfied for an activity to be abnormally dangerous.
Examples of activities which have been said to fall within paragraph 520
include the use of explosives, vibrations caused by construction works,
spread of fire, escape of water, toxic and radioactive emissions, and
contamination of land and water.33 Strict liability is incurred only in
respect of harm of which there is abnormal risk. If a plant producing
chemicals discharges noxious waste into the subsoil and the aquifer, the
operators will be strictly liable for harm caused to their neighbours'
health, but not for injuries suffered by a local resident in a road accident
involving one of their lorries.
D. Models of liability
The question of definition may now be left on one side. The rest of this
paper is concerned with possible models of liability. The models
commonly encountered are strict liability,34 presumption of liability,35 and
fault-based liability.36 In addition, something will be said about non-
32. The First Restatement had imposed liability on "ultra-hazardous" activities, defined
as those which (i) necessarily involved a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of
others, (ii) could not be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and (iii) were not a matter
of common usage.
33. For a comprehensive analysis of American case law, see W. K. Jones, "Strict Liability
for Hazardous Enterprise" (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 1705-1770 at pp.1715-1751.
34. Pt III.
35. Pt IV.
36. PtV.
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delegable duties of care,37 and about identifying the person to whom the
liability attaches.38
III. STRICT LIABILITY
THE assumption that strict liability is "stricter" than fault-based liability is
implicit in the conflicting policy arguments put forward in favour of
different types of rules. But the assumption should not go unchallenged.
Not only is strict liability an elusive concept,39 but it is rarely applied with
full vigour, for there is a natural reluctance to attribute liability to
unintentional acts.40
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that codified provisions
imposing strict liability often permit a range of defences. Article 1079 of
the Russian Federation Code, for example, allows the defender to escape
liability if he can prove that the harm arose as a result of insuperable
force, or due to the intentional conduct of the victim. The rule of volenti
non fit injuria applies, and the level of damages may be reduced to take
into account contributory negligence or the financial status of the
defender.
The scope of strict liability may also be restricted in ways which are
more fundamental.
A. The Second Restatement of the Law of Torts
In principle the American Second Restatement of the Law of Torts
(1977) imposes strict liability. Paragraph 519 is unequivocal. A defendant
is liable even where he has "exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm;" nor is liability avoided when the harm has been caused by the
intervention of a third party, or by force of nature. This rule is followed by
most States,41 although some exclude liability if the natural occurrence
was unforeseeable, or if the action of a third party could not have been
prevented by the exercise of reasonable care.
Strict liability is not displaced merely because the victim failed to
exercise reasonable care to discover the harmful activity and to protect
himself against it. However, the victim is deemed to have assumed the risk
if he knowingly exposed himself to the danger42—a rule which contrasts
with the principle of nuisance law that it is no defence when the plaintiff
37. PlVI.
38. P tv i i .
39. V. Palmer, "In Quest of a Strict Liability Standard Under the Code" (1982) 56 Tulane
Law Review 1317-1329 at p. 1317.
40. See P. Cane, The Anatomy of Ton Law (1997), pp.49-50.
41. The Second Restatement, para-522. See for example Yukon Equipment Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 585 Alaska P.2d 1206 (1978).
42. Idem, para.524.
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has "come" to a nuisance. One possible effect is to allow a hazardous
enterprise to set up an "exclusion zone" over land which it does not own.
As in nuisance law, strict liability is also displaced if the plaintiff, by the
nature of his activities, has made himself unusually sensitive to harm.
But there is a more basic issue which the American litigant must
address. Strict liability is confined to activities which are abnormally
dangerous within the meaning of paragraph 520 of the Restatement
(discussed earlier);43and the criteria listed for this purpose (risk, fore-
seeability, gravity of harm, and so on) coincide in large measure with
those used in negligence analysis. In effect, the plaintiff is asked to prove
negligence in order to bring the defendant's activities within a regime of
strict liability.44 This conclusion suggests a more general point. In
formulating a general definition of dangerous activity it is difficult to
avoid criteria which refer back to negligence. Rules which isolate
abnormally dangerous activities as a separate category do so because they
view them as imposing "a super-risk ... a kind of super-negligence".45
Nevertheless, in the Restatement version of strict liability at least, such
rules leave a relatively heavy onus on the plaintiff.
B. Rylands v. Fletcher
Strict liability as applied by the English Rylands v. Fletcher rule offers the
plaintiff little more solace. For the Rylands v. Fletcher rule has been
"progressively emasculated"46 almost since judgment in the original case
was pronounced. A study of all cases in which Rylands v. Fletcher was
cited between 1865 and 1913 revealed that liability was rarely found
under the rule.47 Although, in principle, the English courts have held that
the rule may apply to a wide range of different substances, they have
43. In pt II(c).
44. See for example Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills 509 N.E. 2d 850 (Ind.App. 1987), 856:
"When deciding to impose para.519 strict liability, we must not look at the abstract
propensities of the particular substance involved, but must analyse the defendant's activity
as a whole.... If the rule were otherwise, virtually every commercial or industrial activity
involving substances which are dangerous only in the abstract automatically would be
deemed as abnormally dangerous. This result would be intolerable." See also Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts(5th edn, 1984), para.78: "When a court applies all of the factors
suggested in the Second Restatement it is doing virtually the same thing as is done with the
negligence concept, except for the fact that it is the function of the court to apply the
abnormally dangerous concept to the facts as found by the jury."
45. K. Kress, "The Serious of Harm Thesis" in D. Owen (Ed.), Philosophical Foun-
dations of Tort Law (1995), pp.277-297 at p.297. See also W. K. Jones, "Strict Liability for
Hazardous Enterprise" (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 1705-1770 at p.1710. Professor
Jones puts forward suggestions for the reformulation of the Restatement rules at p.1713.
46. B. S. Markesinis and S. F. Deakin, Tort Law (1994), p.472.
47. F. H. Newark, "Non-natural UseT and Rylands v. Fletcher" (1961) 24 Modern Law
Review 557-571.
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interpreted the general basis of liability in a progressively more restrictive
fashion.
Thus, in the first place, the rule is applied only when the offending
substance has escaped from a place occupied or controlled by the
defendant to a place outside his control.48 In contrast with the American
rules for example,49 it has no scope when the damage occurs on the
defendant's own land.
Secondly, the rule applies only to property damage, leaving liability for
personal injuries to be determined by the law of negligence.50
Thirdly, the scope of the rule is narrowed by the existence of a large
number of defences. The plaintiff may not claim damages if he has
increased the risk to his property, and he cannot increase his neighbour's
liability if he puts his own property to some special use.31 There is no
liability if the plaintiff has agreed to the risk, or, by extension, if the
potentially dangerous substance has been kept on the premises for the
benefit of both plaintiff and defendant.52 A defence is also available if the
damage was precipitated by the actions of a third party which could not
have been foreseen,53 or if the escape was caused by an act of God which
could not have been predicted or protected against.54
Fourthly, in Rylands v. Fletcher, Lord Cairns stated that if the offending
substance was collected "in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land"
and as a consequence of the "natural use" of the land, then strict liability
did not apply.55 Over the years, a wide view has been taken of "natural"
use, and a correspondingly narrow view of "non-natural" use.
Fifthly, liability has become entangled with foreseeability in such a way
as to blur the distinction between strict and fault-based liability.
These last two points require further discussion.
Natural and non-natural use
Just as, with the American Restatement, much turns on the meaning of
"abnormally dangerous activities", so with Rylands v. Fletcher the scope
48. Read v. Lyons & Co. [1913] A.C. 263.
49. E.g. Garcia v. Estate of Norton 183 Cal.App.3d 413 (1986). The court held the
employer strictly liable for injuries received by his employee in an explosion which occurred
while they were working on a waste oil tanker with a blowtorch in the employer's yard.
50. See R. Buckley, The Law of Nuisance (2nd edn, 19%), pp.53-54.
51. Robinson v. Kilvcrt (1889) 41 Ch.Div. 88; Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. Ltd
v. Cape Town Tramways [1902] A.C 381.
52. E.g. a water supply for both parties (although a claim in negligence may be possible in
such circumstances), Carstairs v. Taylor (1871) L.R. 6 Ex. 217.
53. Perry v. Kendricks Transport Ltd [1956] 1 W.L.R. 85.
54. Nichols v. Marsland (1876) 2 Ex.D. 1, 280. In modem times the availability of
technology with the capability for such prediction or protection narrows the scope of this
defence.
55. Supra n.20, at 338-339. Non-natural was denned as "introducing into the close that
which in its natural condition was not in or upon it".
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of strict liability is largely determined by the meaning given to "non-
natural use". If a use is a "natural" one, Rylands v. Fletcher does not apply
and liability requires fault. Accordingly, a broad definition of "natural"
will largely exclude the operation of strict liability.
In the mid-nineteenth century "natural use" suggested agriculture,
forestry or mining and excluded industrial and urban uses.56 The
twentieth century cases, however, have tended to interpret "natural" as
meaning the usual and the ordinary. In Rickards v. Lor/z/a/i^premises
were flooded as a consequence of a blocked basin in the defendant's
lavatory on a floor above. The Privy Council declined to impose strict
liability for damage resulting from the installation of a basic facility.
"Natural use" was taken to include any use which was a normal incident
of urban living. For the rule to apply:
It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others and
must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for
the general benefit of the community.5*
This formulation isolates two issues which have tended to mesh awk-
wardly in versions of the natural use test, namely (i) the appropriateness
of the activity to the locality, and (ii) the social utility of the defendant's
activities. Both can be found in paragraph 520 of the American
Restatement, discussed above.59
(ii) merits closer examination. If benefit to the community outweighs
risk, the American Restatement would not classify the activity as
abnormally dangerous. But the logic here seems dubious. A socially
useful hazard is no less dangerous than one which is entirely frivolous. An
alternative approach might be to accept the status as abnormally
dangerous, but to allow its perpetrator a defence on the basis of its utility
to the community.
In England discussion of (ii) has focused mainly on the meaning of
"community". In Cambridge Water Company v. Eastern Counties
Leather60 Lord Goff thought that this must refer to a local community, not
to the community at large.61 More recently a different line was taken. In
Ellison v. Ministry of Defence62 the plaintiffs' property was damaged by a
56. J. S. Breariey, "Public Welfare v. 'Natural Use' of Land as the Basis for Liability in
Environmental Damage Cases" (1995) 7 Journal of Environmental Law 119-136 at p.125.
57. [1913] A . C 263.
58. Idem, per Lord Moulton at 280.
59. Para.520 lists a number of factors for the determination of whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous. Factors (d) and (e) correspond to (i), and factor (f) to (ii).
60. [1994] 2 A.C. 264, hereinafter "Cambridge Water Company".
61. In Cambridge Water Company, idem, the defendant company was an important
employer in the local, largely rural community. Nevertheless, Lord Goff held, at 309, that it
could not escape liability on this basis. Despite its benefit in employment terms, this "small
industrial complex" could not be deemed to be making a natural or ordinary use of land.
6Z (1996)81B.L.R.1O8.
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sudden, dramatic flood of rainwater accumulated as a result of construc-
tion works at the Greenham Common military airbase. The defendants
had been constructing bulk-fuel installations to store fuel for fighter
planes, which was clearly not a natural use, in the sense of the provision of
services to the local community. Nevertheless, Bowsher J, sitting in the
Queen's Bench Division, deemed such a use to be "natural" as it was for
the benefit of "the national community as a whole".63
If the wide definition of "natural use" used in Ellison were to be applied
in future cases, the scope of the Rylands v. Fletcher rule would become
very narrow. The few "non-natural" uses still identified as such would
normally be prevented by a refusal of planning permission; and since
permission is not granted unless the development conforms to the
planning strategy for the area and to the needs of the local community, the
uses to which such permitted developments are put would almost always
conform with Bowsher J's definition of "natural use". This would confine
Rylands v. Fletcher to such uses as were not anticipated at the time
planning permission was granted, or which began before the advent of
such controls.
Foreseeability
In Cambridge Water Company v. Eastern Counties Leather6* the House of
Lords accepted Newark's categorisation of the Rylands v. Fletcher rule as
an extension of the law of nuisance to cases of isolated escape;63 and since
under nuisance law damages are awarded only if injury of the relevant
type was foreseeable by the defendant, foreseeability was accepted as a
component of Rylands v. Fletcher also.
In Cambridge Water Company, solvents used by the defendant in the
process of tanning leathers had, over a long period of years, seeped
through the tannery floor, through the soil below and thence to the water
table, ultimately reaching the plaintiffs borehole more than a mile away.
The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen at the time of the
spillages that a leakage would result in contamination of this type. Hence
there was no liability. However, the court was careful to say that the
requirement of foreseeability did not detract from the "strict" nature of
the liability. If damage of the relevant type was foreseeable, the
defendant was liable, notwithstanding the fact that he took all due care to
avoid damage.
63. Idem, p.119.
64. [1994] 2 A.C 264.
65. "The Boundaries of Nuisance" at 487-488. Blackburn J's original statement of the
rule had referred to any substance "likely to do mischief if it escapes", and liability was
imposed for the "natural and anticipated consequences". For an analysis of foreseeability in
this context, see D. Wilkinson, "Cambridge Water Company v. Eastern Counties Leather pic.
Diluting Liability for Continuing Escapes" (1994) Modern Law Review 799-810.
OCTOBER 1999] Liability for Dangerous Activities 741
This analysis is problematical. It should be recalled that in tort law the
policy justification for foreseeability is avoidability. A defendant who was
unable to foresee the consequences of his actions was unable to take the
necessary steps to avoid the harm and should not be liable for it.66 But
strict liability disregards questions of avoidability. Whether the defendant
attempted to avoid the harm is of no importance. He is liable anyway. It is
not clear, therefore, why foreseeability of harm should matter.
This is not to argue that there is no role for foreseeability, but rather
that in Cambridge Water Company it is put in the wrong place. It is of the
nature of most Rylands v. Fletcher cases that, while the precise circum-
stances of the harmful escape are unforeseeable, a significant risk of some
form of damage is apparent from the outset. Thus a more relevant
foreseeability test would assess the defendant's capacity at the point when
he engaged upon the dangerous activity to predict the possibility of harm
of some sort, rather than his ability to foresee the actual consequences of
the escape.
Another ground for doubting Cambridge Water Company is that it
does not fit all the cases. Roughly speaking, Rylands v. Fletcher cases fall
into two broad categories. Type A cases, such as Cambridge Water
Company and Read v. Lyons,61 concern the escape of intrinsically
dangerous substances (respectively chemicals and explosives). The
escape may have a long-term pollutant effect as well as, or instead of,
causing immediate damage. It is characteristic of such cases that the exact
consequences of escape are unpredictable, especially in relation to
historic pollution when scientific methods of prediction were much less
sophisticated. But what can normally be predicted is that harm of some
kind will occur. In instructing the offending operations, the defendant has
imported the risk of an accident occurring, and it is on this basis of created
risk that strict liability regimes are normally constructed. Thus in many
US jurisdictions knowledge of the extent of the potential danger is not a
prerequisite of liability.68 In Cambridge Water Company thousands of
litres of the offending chemical had been spilt over the years. At the time
of the spillages, few could have predicted that the leakage would
contaminate a distant water source, but the possibility of some damage
occurring when it penetrated the subsoil must have been less in doubt.
Type B cases, such as Rylands v. Fletcher itself,69 Rickards v. Lothian
and Ellison v. Ministry of Defence, involve the accumulation of a
substance which is not intrinsically dangerous in itself. Usually it is water.
66. See S. Perry, "Risk, Harm and Responsibility" in D. G. Owen (Ed.), The
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1995), pp321-346 at pJ43.
67. [1913] A.C. 263.
68. Garcia v. Estate of Norton 183 Cal.App3d 413 (1986).
69. See also Rickards v. Lothian [1913] A.C. 263 and Ellison v. Ministry of Defence (1996)
81 B.L.R. 108.
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The escape which causes damage is normally attributable to a structural
or engineering failure, and there are generally no long-term pollutant
effects. In type B cases it is easier to predict the type of damage, but the
escape itself is often more difficult to foresee. In Ellison, the plaintiffs
resorted to a sophisticated computer model in an attempt to demonstrate
the foreseeability of the freak storm and the flash flood which followed.
The court was unconvinced. Once the flood waters escaped, however,
structural damage in the surrounding area would have been a likely
outcome. The foreseeability requirement formulated in Cambridge Water
Company, a type A case, does not take account of the different issues
involved in type B cases.
Four further points may be made. First, it is not clear whether
Cambridge Water Company places the onus upon the plaintiff to prove
the foreseeability of harm, or whether the burden is upon the defendant
to plead the defence that the harm was not foreseeable. As Ellison shows,
the former interpretation would place a daunting burden on the plaintiff.
Secondly, in Rylands v. Fletcher itself, Lord Cairns appeared to take for
granted that the liability being imposed was stricter than under the law of
nuisance.70 That view does not appear to survive the decision in
Cambridge Water Company.
Thirdly, if the Rylands v. Fletcher rule is now part of the law of nuisance,
other aspects of nuisance law will also apply. For example, following the
recent case of Hunter v. Canary Wharf,11 only owners and tenants would
have title to sue, and relatives and invitees of those persons must seek
redress in other ways. Following Leakey v. National Trust for Places of
Historic Interest or Natural Beauty,72 the occupier's duty to prevent harm
would require to be judged taking into account the resources of the
parties.
Fourthly, there is the problem of continuing contamination. In
Cambridge Water Company pools of the solvent were still present in the
aquifer underneath the tannery and would carry on penetrating the
plaintiffs water supply. But if liability for continuing harm is assessed by
reference to the foreseeability of damage when the pollution first began, it
would seem to follow that past ignorance is an excuse for continuing
pollution. Certainly that seems to have been the view adopted in
Cambridge Water Company. The continuing damage was not foreseeable
when the defendant created the conditions which caused it, and the
solvent had now passed beyond the defendant's control and been
irretrievably lost in the ground below. When a dangerous substance has
escaped beyond the defendant's control, then, in the court's view, there is
70. Supra n.20, at 340.
71. [1997] A.C. 655.
72. [1980] Q.B. 485.
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strict liability only for those consequences foreseeable at the stage when
he still did have control. Naturally, if strict liability fails, negligence is
likely to fail also, due to the absence of foreseeability.
C. Summary: the intrusion of negligence
The impact of strict liability is restricted, not only by the availability of
defences but by the intrusion of negligence. When, as in the American
Restatement or in Rylands v. Fletcher, strict liability is imposed in respect
of a general category of dangerous activities (as opposed to a fixed list),
the terminology of negligence law has a tendency to reassert itself.
Non-specific categorisations of such activities justify the imposition of
strict liability by reference to risk and foreseeability. But the result can be
tantamount to asking the plaintiff to prove negligence before he can enjoy
strict liability.
IV. PRESUMPTION OF LIABILITY
A. France
The French rules on liability for damage caused by things are less
susceptible to the pull of negligence. In place of strict liability there is a
presumption of liability. Article 1384.1 of the Code Civil provides that:
One is responsible not only for the harm which one causes by one's own
action, but also for that which is caused by the action of persons for whom
one is answerable, or by things which one has in one's keeping.73
Article 1384.1 makes no distinction between things which are hazardous
and things which are not.74 The provision applies to obvious hazards, of
course, for example liquid oxygen,75 explosives,76 or tree-cutting equip-
ment77; but the offending thing may also be a perfectly ordinary object
73. "On est responsable non seulcmcnt du dommage que I'on cause par son propre fait,
mais encore de celui que at causi par le fait des personnes dont on doit rtpondre, ou des
choses que I'on a sous sa garde." Art 1384.1 was originally read in conjunction with Arts
1385 and 1386 as setting out a strict basis of liability only when harm was caused by an animal
or dangerous building under the defender's control. However, as in other systems, the
increased hazards of mechanisation raised the question of compensation for those who
suffered harm as the result of industrial accidents. In a landmark decision in 1896, the Cour
de Cassation ruled that Art. 1384.1 could be interpreted as a general stand-alone provision
setting out a presumption of responsibility when damage is caused by things of whatever
sort. (See Dalloz Ptriodique 1897.1.433, and also commentary thereon by Saleilles. Art
1384.1 was used as the basis upon which to award damages in favour of a widow who sued
her husband's employers after he was killed by an exploding boiler.)
74. Arrit Jand'heur, Dalloz Ptriodique 1930.1.57.
76. Vilte de Monligny-les-Metz v. Sit Cardem et aulres, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1994 J. 80.
77. La Mutuelle du Mans assurance 1ARD v. Ban Qv.(2) 12 Dec. 1994.
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such as a tree,78 a tombstone,79 a garage door,80 or a sheet of thin
polystyrene.81
The modern view is that Article 1384.1 imposes une presomption de
responsabilite, a presumption of liability rather than a presumption of
fault. The defendant escapes liability only if he can prove that the accident
occurred due to force majeure or unforeseeable circumstances beyond his
control.82 The heavy onus placed on the defendant is said to create an
"objective theory of created risk",83 and favours the victims of accidents
rather than those who have provided their cause, however uninten-
tionally. This encourages claims. When the Pearson Committee visited
France in 1975 it was told that 75,000 personal injury cases per year were
heard in the French courts, while in the UK the comparable figure was
2.0OO.84
In practice, the rules are complicated by the bewildering variety of
situations to which Article 1384.1 may be applied. If a moving object has
caused harm by colliding with the plaintiffs person or his property, the
presumption of responsibility means that the plaintiff need prove only
causation.85 But if the thing was stationery, or in motion but did not
collide with the plaintiff, it must be established that the object was the
cause giniratrice, the "generating cause" of the accident.86^ practice the
plaintiffs task is to do this by showing that the object (i) was defective, (ii)
that it functioned abnormally, or (iii) that it was placed in an abnormal
position.
In theory, fault is irrelevant. If, for example, the object was defective,
and the causal link thus established, its keeper cannot escape liability by
proving that he was not at fault.87 But the situation is less clear in cases
78. Leroux v. Cons. Mauger, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1966 J. 700.
79. Veuve Casiel v. Veuve Douillard, Dalloz Piriodique 1939 J. 72.
80. £px Briire v. CPCAM de Lyon, Civ.(2) 8 June 1994.
81. Electriciti de France v. Chiaramonti, Civ.(2) 13 April 1995. In his enthusiasm after the
famous ruling in Jand'heur, Josserand observed that accidents are almost always due to the
agency of a thing, Dalloz Periodique 1930 Chronique 25-28, while Ripert responded that, if
that were the case, fault-based liability was as good as reduced to collisions between nudists,
Dalloz Piriodique 30 1.57 at p.59.
82. Ledore c. Gilbertas, CAA Lyon 10 May 1985: "Le gardien d'une chose ne peui
s'exontrer de sa responsabiliti qu'en rapportant la preuve d'un tvincmcnt imprivisiblc et
irresistible."
83. See M. S. Amos and F. P. Walton, Introduction to French Law (3rd edn, 1967), p.205.
84. Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury Cmnd. 7054 (1978), para366.
85. See J. Bell et al Principles of French Law (1998), pp377-378. A separate set of rules
now operates for road traffic accidents since the Loi Badinter of 1985, supra n.14.
86. S.N.C.F. v. Papot, Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 1971 J. 690.
87. Starclc, Roland, Boyer Obligations; 1 Responsabiliti Dilictuelle (5th edn, 1996),
paras.453-462: "de toute anomalie on ne peut conclurc d iexistence d'une faute". But
compare with A. Tune "The Twentieth Century Development and Function of the Law of
Torts in France" (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q. 1089-1103 at p.10%: "As a matter of fact, our courts
usually discharge the custodian when he can give evidence that he, or the person who was
actually in control of the thing, has not committed any fault".
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where the object functioned abnormally or was placed in an abnormal
situation. It can be difficult to separate the notion of abnormality from the
concept of fault,88 and considerations such as the reasonableness of the
defendant's behaviour may come into play.89 In Electricity de France c.
Chiaramonti, for example, a representative from EDF visiting Mme.
Chiaramonti's house fell through a hole in her floor to the cellar below.
The hole had been covered by a thin sheet of white polystyrene. Liability
was found under Article 1384.1 on the basis that the polystyrene had been
placed "in an abnormal manner" by Mme. Chiaramonti. The plaintiffs
argued successfully that she had "committed a fault" by placing the
polystyrene in this way. The judgement refers to considerations such as
whether a person of "normal" vigilance would have noticed the danger,
and whether the cellar opening should "normally" have been covered by
a more substantial material.
In English law the facts of Electriciti de France c. Chiaramonti would be
treated, not as strict liability, but as occupiers' liability. So would a
number of other cases which, in France, fall under Article 1384.1—for
example, Veuve Castel c. Veuve Douillard,90 where a tombstone fell from
a sepulchre and caused injury. Doubtless the occupiers in such cases failed
to exercise "such care as in all the circumstance of the case is reasonable"
to ensure the safety of those entering their property as required under the
Occupiers' Liability Act 1984. Like the French "keeper" under Article
1384.1, an English occupier may be held liable despite having no direct
part in the incident in question. The criterion applied is whether the
defendant "has sufficient degree of control over premises that he ought to
realise that any failure on his part to use care may result in injury to a
person lawfully coming there"."From this element of control arises a
positive duty to maintain the safety of premises, which is arguably more
rigorous than the liability for omissions encountered in general negli-
gence law.
Article 1384.1 does not govern all cases. If an accident was caused
primarily by the actions of an individual rather than any actual or
presumed fault in the keeping or handling of an object, claims fall under
Article 1382, the general rule on delictual liability, which requires a
finding of fault Concurrent liability under Articles 1382 and 1384.1 is
possible, although infrequent. An illustration of the interaction between
1382 and 1384.1 can be found in Ledore c. Gilbertas^hich concerned a
set of goalposts knocked out of position at the premises of a sports club.
88. J. Carbonnier Thiorie des obligations (1963), p.428.
89. See W. S. Malone, "Ruminations on Liability for the Acts of Things" (1982) 42
Louisiana Law Review 979-1009 at p.991.
90. Datloz Piriodique 1939 J. 72.
91. Wheat v. Lacon [1966] AX. 552 per Lord Denning at 578.
92. CA.A. Lyon 10 May 1985.
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As the posts were being replaced, a 13-year-old boy, Gilbertas, jumped up
to swing on the crossbar. M. Ledore, a club member, rushed to steady the
frame, but was injured when it toppled over him. M Ledore sued M. and
Mme. Gilbertas, the boy's parents, and the sports club. The actions of the
boy were sufficient to constitute fault under Article 1382, although in this
case his parents could not be found vicariously liable since at the time of
the incident he was under the supervision of the club. On the other hand,
the sports club was held liable under Article 1384.1 as the keepers of the
goalposts which had injured M. Ledore.
B. Louisiana
In North America the French rule was, as usual, exported both to
Louisiana and to Quebec, but has come to acquire a life of its own.
In Louisiana Article 2317 of the Civil Code provides that:
We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but
for that which is caused by the act of... things which we have in our custody.
At first this was interpreted as imposing strict liability,93 but later cases
required an unreasonable risk of harm.94 Relevant factors for this purpose
included the probability of risk occurring, the gravity of the consequences
if it did, and the burden of adequate precautions.95 Following a "turf war"
between the legislature and the supreme court,96 a new Article 2317.1 was
added in 1996 introducing a requirement of fault:
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by
its ruin, vice or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise
of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice or defect which
caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the
exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable
care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.
93. Loescher v. Parr 324 So.441 (La.1975), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court found
liability against the owner of a magnolia tree when the tree collapsed upon a car. Although
the trunk of the tree was found to be 90% rotten, there was no reason that the owner should
have known this.
94. Entrevia v. Hood 4T7 So.2d 1146 (La.1983).
95. Verrett v. Cameron Telephone Co., 417 So.2d 1319 (La.App. 1982), 1325-26.
96. See F. L. Maraisl and T. C. GaJligan Jr., "The Ongoing 'Turf War' for Louisiana Tort
Law; Interpreting Immunity and the Solidarity Skirmish" (1995) 56 Louisiana Law Review
215-230. There had also been considerable academic debate concerning strict liability for
the acts of things. See for example W. S. Malone, op cit., supra nJ89 which concludes as
follows: "the plasticity of the negligence concept and its capacity to adjust itself to an
everchanging world strongly recommends it as a vehicle that should not lightly be cast
aside."
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While some commentators have viewed this reform as an attack on the
civil law tradition in Louisiana,97 others have pointed out that in most
cases brought under the old Article 2317 "liability could have easily been
imposed on a negligence basis".9*
C. Quebec
The experience in Quebec has been similar. The analogous provision in
the Civil Code of Lower Canada, imposing liability for the acts of things,
was Article 1054. However, the Quebec doctrine was not interpreted as
broadly as its French counterpart,99 and Article 1054 has now been recast
as Article 1465 of the new Quebec Civil Code:
A person entrusted with the custody of a thing is liable to reparation for
injury resulting from the autonomous act of the thing, unless he proves that
he is not at fault.
The obvious distinction between the new Code provisions in Quebec and
Louisiana is that in the latter the onus is on the plaintiff to prove fault,
although leaving open the possibility of that onus being reversed under
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In Quebec, the onus of proof is on the
defendant from the outset to prove absence of fault. But perhaps the
more important point is that in the two "mixed" jurisdictions100 where
French law has been influential, the notion of fault has come to qualify
liability for things.
V. FAULT-BASED LIABILITY
A. Scotland
The idea that Rylands v. Fletcher might apply in Scotland has been
described by the House of Lords as "a heresy which ought to be
extirpated".101 In the modem law, liability for dangerous activities is
97. See F. L. Maraist and T. C GaUigan Jr., "Burying Caesar Civil Justice Reform and
the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law" (19%) 51 Tulane Law Review 339-412.
98. W. S. Malone, op at., supra n.89, at p. 1001.
99. See P. A. Crepeau, "Liability for Damage Caused by Things from the Civil Law Point
of View" (1962) 40 Canadian Bar Review 222-239.
100. I.e. jurisdictions which display a mixture of common law and civil law.
101. RHM Bakeries v. Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 S.C(H.L-) 17 per Lord Fraser at
41. Lord Fraser's words have been cited several times since in the Scots courts. A Scottish
Outer House case decided just after Cambridge Water Company, supra n.60 and just before
Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Ply Ltd (1994) 179 C.L.R. 520 restates the Scottish
position unequivocally. In McQueen v. The Glasgow Garden Festival (1988) Lid, 1995 S.L.T.
211, any line of argument "reminiscent of ... Rylands v. Fletcher" was firmly rejected by
Lord Cullen at 213.
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determined within the general framework of delictual liability, and fault
must be shown.102
Type A cases: heightened duty of care
The basis of culpa for type A cases (accumulation of an intrinsically
dangerous substance)103 was stated by the Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff in
Chalmers v. Dixon in the following way:
If a man puts upon his land a new combination of materials, which he
knows, or ought to know are of a dangerous nature, then either due care will
prevent injury, in which case he is liable if injury occurs for not taking that
due care, or else no precautions will prevent injury, in which case he is liable
for his original act in placing the material upon the ground.104
This is, of course, a heightened duty of care, which corresponds to the
heightened risk imposed upon the pursuer by the presence of dangerous
substances. Even a slight lack of care may be enough to constitute
fault:105in Donoghue v. Stevenson, Lord Macmillan suggested that, in
relation to the intrinsically hazardous, "the degree of diligence required is
so stringent as to amount almost to a guarantee of safety".106 In the
absence of an alternative explanation consistent with lack of fault on the
part of the defender, the pursuer may also invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.™
Type B cases: rebuttable presumption of fault
Many of the type B cases (accumulation of a substance not intrinsically
dangerous) concern flooding caused during the construction of the
railway network in the nineteenth century. In one of the earliest,108 the
102. It was suggested in RHM Bakeries v. Strathclyde Regional Council, supra n.101 on the
authority of a House of Lords case in 1917, Caledonian Railway Company v. Corporation of
Creenock, 1917 S.L.T. 67, that the only circumstances in which the Rylands v. Fletcher rule
might possibly apply in Scots law was when a proprietor interfered with the natural flow of a
stream. In fact, while several English cases including Rylands v. Fletcher were cited in that
case, all were distinguished. (See Lord Wrenbury at 74 "To construct a reservoir on your
own land is a lawful act To close or divert a natural line of flow so as to render it less efficient
is not It has never been held that in such a case there is not liability.") Most of the dicta in
that case concerning the basis of liability explain it by reference to fault. Lord Finlay, LC
concludes, at 70, that "the appellants, in constructing the culvert, ought to have foreseen the
possibility of such an occurrence and to have provided against i f The rule as formulated in
that case derives mainly from analysis of the nineteenth century Scots case law.
103. I.e. type A as identified in pt III above in the context of Rylands v. Fletcher.
104. (1876) 3 R. 461,464.
105. See for example Nautilus Steamship Co. Ltd v. David Henderson and Co. Ltd 1919
S.C 605 (use of oxyacetylene flame by repairers); Fitzpatrick v. Melville 1926 S.L.T 478
(storing of poison near public area); Gilmour v. Simpson 1958 S.C. 477 (use of blow lamp).
106. 1932S.C(H.L.)31,65.
107. E.g. Devine v. ColvUles Ud 1969 S.C.(H.L) 67; D. Mclntyre &. Son Ltd. v. Souiar 1980
S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 115.
108. Samuel v. Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway Company (1850) 13 D. 312.
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pursuer's land was flooded by water accumulated in a railway cutting. He
argued that fault need not be established, and that it was sufficient to
prove causation. That argument was rejected. Lord Cockburn stated that
the defender was "bound to provide against the ordinary operations of
nature, but not against her miracles."109
The best-known case, Kerrv. Earl of Orkney,110 decided some ten years
before Rylands v. Fletcher, involved flood damage after the defender's
dam had collapsed. Perhaps because the defender's building works were
so obviously defective, the nature of the requirement for fault was barely
discussed.'"The basis of liability is, however, suggested in the judgment
given at first instance:
This fact [the flooding] occurring in reference to a recent work, constructed
by a private party for his own pleasure, must be held to throw on the
respondent the burden of explaining the fact on some footing consistent
with the strength and sufficiency of the work.
This is a presumption of fault, rather than strict liability. The burden of
proof shifts to the defender, but can be overcome. As was said in a later
case:112
If harm occurs in such a context, provided that the cause is otherwise
unexplained, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, will come into play. This will
raise a presumption of fault on the part of the person who introduced the
dangerous activity. This presumption can be displaced by an explanation by
the defenders consistent with absence of fault...
The presumption of fault created by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not favour the pursuer (plaintiff) to the same extent as the French
presumption of liability. The difference can be illustrated by reference to
two cases, one from Louisiana and one from Scotland.
In Marquez v. City Stores,113 a Louisiana case decided before the 1996
reforms, a small child was injured on an escalator when his foot caught in
the gap between the moving steps and the fixed skirting. The plaintiff did
not prove that the escalator was defective, and the court did not accept
that the escalator had malfunctioned immediately before the incident.
The court also noted that the offending gap measured three sixteenths of
an inch when the national safety standard prescribed that the gap should
not exceed three eighths of an inch. There was, therefore, no finding of
fault, and indeed there were explanations for the incident consistent with
109. Idem, 314.
110. (1857) 20 D. 298.
111. "I never saw a case of such water-works in which the maker had less to say in order to
free himself from liability," idem, per Lord Justice Clerk Hope at 303.
112. Batlard v. North British Railway Company 1923 S.C.(H.L.) 43. A similar approach
was adopted in Potter v. Hamilton and Strathaven Railway Company (1864) 3 M. 83.
113. 371 So.2d 810 (La.1979).
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lack of fault on the part of the store. Nevertheless, the presumption of
liability contained in Article 2317 of the Code was applied against the
store as the keeper of the escalator.
In the Scottish case, McQueen v. The Glasgow Garden Festival (1988)
Ltd,114 the pursuer was injured by flying shrapnel from a firework which
exploded unexpectedly at a display organised by the defenders. The court
declined to infer negligence on the basis of res ipsa loquitur, and Mrs
McQueen's claim failed. Although the precise cause of the accident was
not known, there were possible explanations, such as manufacturers'
negligence, which were consistent with lack of negligence on the part of
the defenders. In similar circumstances French law would almost
certainly apply the presumption of fault discussed above.115
B. South Africa
Rylands v. Fletcher was imported into South Africa by the decision of the
Privy Council in Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. Ltd v. Cape
Town Tramways Co. Ltd.uf> This overruled the view of the appellate
division that Rylands v. Fletcher was inconsistent with Roman-Dutch law.
But in modern times the position has shifted once more. The Rylands v.
Fletcher rule has been decisively rejected, and liability now depends on
fault.117 While strict liability rules exist in specific situations, in the main
they derive from Roman-law actions,118 or are created by recent statute.119
Such rules are regarded as exceptions to the fundamental principle of no
liability without fault.120
C. Australia
Australia has also rejected Rylands v. Fletcher, although much more
recently. In Bumie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd, decided some
114. 1995 S.L.T 211.
115. Contrast McQueen idem, with the French case of Ghirardi v. soaiit Ruggieri, Civ.(2)
30 Oct. 1989, in which Ruggieri were presumed liable when fireworks stored in their
premises exploded prematurely and damaged the Ghirardis' property. See also Owliac v.
Comitt des Flies du Farel, Civ (2) 1 April 1987 in which a young boy found an unexploded
firework after a fireworks display and was injured when he set it off. The Cour de Cassation
overturned the Cour d'appel's ruling that the boy had become the keeper at the relevant
time, and that the presumption of Liability had therefore shifted from the fireworks
organisers.
116. [1902] A .C 381.
117. T. W. Price, "Is the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher part of Roman-Dutch law?" (1953)
South African Law Journal 381-386; J. C. van der Walt, "Strict Liability in the South African
La w of Delict" (1968) 1 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 49-83 at
pp.66-67.
118. E.g. A Clio de effusis vet deiectiy, actio positi vel suspensi; inlerdictum quod vi aut clam.
119. E.g. Nuclear Energy Act 1982.
120. R. G. McKerron The Law of Delia in South Africa (7th edn, 1971), pp.11-12; J.
Neetnling el at Law of Delia (2nd edn, 1994), p.341.
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three months after the decision of the House of Lords in Cambridge
Water Company, the Australian High Court held that the Rylands v.
Fletcher rule should be regarded as having been "absorbed by the
principles of ordinary negligence".121 The case concerned fire damage
caused to property stored by the plaintiffs in the defendants' premises.
The fire was caused by the negligence of a contractor in carrying out
unguarded welding operations near a highly flammable insulating
material, and the case was brought inter alia under the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher, on the basis that welding near flammable material was a
non-natural use. The High Court determined that the Rylands v. Fletcher
rule should be abandoned in favour of the general principles of
negligence. It reasoned that, in effect, the rule did not preserve liability in
any areas not covered by ordinary negligence, and that negligence now
"encompassed and overlay the territory in which the Rylands v. Fletcher
rule operated".122 The qualifications made to the rule over the years, and
in particular the transformation of the non-natural use test into a test of
"special" and "not ordinary" use,123 had caused it to "degenerate into an
essentially unprincipled and ad hoc subjective determination".124 Negli-
gence law represented a more "coherent" alternative.125
The decision in Burnie Port Authority was not unanimous. Two of the
judges were concerned that the rules of negligence offered little more
certainty than Rylands v. Fletcher. Moreover, Brennan J suggested that
special difficulties attach to hazardous activities which the mainstream
rules of negligence do not address:
As long as it remains the law that a person is not liable in negligence for a
reasonably foreseeable risk of injury unless a reasonably practicable
alternative means of avoiding the risk was also available to the defendant,
liability will continue to exist under Rylands v. Fletcher in cases where it
does not exist in negligence.126
121. Supra n.101, at 556, (hereinafter "Burnie Port Authority"). For commentary on this
case, see R. F. V. Heuston and R. A. Buckley, T h e Return of Rylands v. Fletcher" (1994)
110 Law Quarterly Review 506-509; S. Dziobon and R. Mullender, "Formalism Forever
Thwarted: Rylands v. Fletcher in Australia" (1995) Cambridge Law Journal 23-25.
12Z Supra n.101, at 547.
123. Their lordships were aware of the decision of the House of Lords in Cambridge Water
Company, supra n.60, but did not refer to Lord Goffs restrictive interpretation of
"non-natural" use in that case. Indeed, the two dissenting judges in Burnie Port Authority
supra n.101, who favoured retaining the Rylands v. Fletcher rule would not in the end have
found the Port Authority liable under the rule, for the reason that they deemed the use of
the premises which the defendant had authorised to be an ordinary one, and not a
"non-natural" one.
124. Idem, at 540.
125. /<fcm,at544.
126. Won, at 591.
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However, as the example of Scotland shows, this difficulty can be met by
deeming the defendant at fault if he has introduced a hazard which all due
care is unable to control.
D. Strict liability and fault-based liability compared
The difference between strict and fault-based liability is not as great as
might be supposed. Since in practice each is modified so as to take on
some aspects of the other, it is hardly surprising that they should
sometimes arrive at the same results. As has been observed:127
There are of course cases in which there is little difference in the result
between the application of the English rule of absolute liability and the
Scottish rule of culpa, where the facts raise a presumption of negligence so
compelling as to be practically incapable of being displaced.
But important differences remain. To retain a fault-based framework is to
avoid some at least of the difficulties created by Rylands v. Fletcher.
Foreseeability relates to general harm rather than to the specifics of the
particular accident which has actually occurred.128Claims may be made in
respect of personal injuries as well as injury to property.129 There is no
requirement that the substance escape, and hence no distinction between
harm occurring on and harm occurring off the defendant's premises.130
Relatives and invitees have title to sue on the same terms as the owners
and tenants of the land upon which the damage occurs. And finally the
strained distinction between natural and unnatural uses of land does not
require to be applied.
VI. NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES OF CARE
A different way of approaching the same problem is to say that if (a) a
person engages in a hazardous activity (b) for that purpose he uses an
independent contractor, and (c) the independent contractor is negligent,
then (d) the negligence of the independent contractor transfers across to
the principal engaging in the activity. Since the contractor is independent,
there is normally no question of vicarious liability; but in its place comes
the idea that, in relation to hazardous activities, the duty of care cannot be
127. McLaughlan v. Craig 1948 S.C 599 per Lord President Cooper at 611.
128. Hughav. Lord Advocate 1963 S.C(H.L.)31. (This Scots House of Lords case was not
cited in Cambridge Water Company, supra n.60.)
129. That was already the case in the (now rejected) Australian version of Rylands v.
Fletcher. See Benning v. Wong (1969) 122 C.L.R. 249.
130. Burnic Port Authority supra n.101, at 557: "It is unnecessary for the purposes of the
present case to express a concluded view on the question whether the duty of care owed, in
such circumstances, to a lawful visitor on the premises is likewise a non-delegable one. The
ordinary processes of legal reasoning by analogy, induction and deduction would prima
facie indicate that it is."
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delegated. It is possible to characterise this approach as a form of strict
liability, for the defendant is liable even although he is not at fault. But
fault remains an underlying requirement, for if the contractor is not
negligent, there is no liability.131
The doctrine of non-delegable duties of care is found in systems with
fault-based liability. That is no surprise. A transference of negligence is a
convenient way of penalising those who engage in hazardous activities.
To insist on personal negligence would be to set the threshold of liability
too high. Thus the doctrine of non-delegation is recognised both in
Scotland132and in South Africa;133 and it was introduced to Australia in
Burnie Port Authority,,134 the very case which rejected Rylands v. Fletcher
in favour of fault-based liability.
But non-delegation is also recognised in some strict liability systems,
including England and the United States. Indeed, the construction of
Messrs Rylands and Horrocks' reservoir, on a different analysis, could
well be seen as giving rise to a non-delegable duty of care when these
gentlemen instructed their contractors to start the works. This is further
evidence of the common ground between systems which outwardly may
seem very different.
An example from California is Ramsey v. Marutamaya Ogatsu
Fireworks Company.™ Technicians were injured in a firework display
due to a defect in the manufacture of two of the fireworks. They
attempted to recover damages from the display organisers, as well as from
the manufacturers. Californian case law suggested that a public firework
display would not have been classified as an abnormally dangerous
activity which attracted strict liability under Restatement paragraphs 519
and 520. However, the court deemed this to be a sufficiently dangerous
131. "Although the doctrine of extra-hazardous acts is sometimes treated as an exception
to the genera] rule that a principal is not liable for the negligence of his independent
contractor, it is in truth an instance of strict liability for breach of duty of care which the
principal personally owes to the plaintiff, Stevens v. Brodribb Sawmilling Co. Pty Ltd
(1986) 160 C.L.R. 16 per Mason CJ at 29-30. See also Stoneman v. Lyons (1975) 133 C.L.R.
550. But while Mason CJ concluded in Stevens that the doctrine "had no place in Australian
law", he was a member of the later court which accorded it recognition in Burnie Port
Authority, supra n.101.
13Z Noble's Trs. v. Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd. 1988 S.L.T. 662.
133. Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v. De Valence 1991 1 S.A.l(A).
134. See E. Fisher," Risk, Justice and Independent Contractors: The Demise of the Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher in Australia" (1995) 7 Journal of Environmental Law 199-223.
135. 72 Cal.AppJd 516 (1977 Cal.App.). This case invites comparison with McQueen v.
The Glasgow Garden Festival (1988) Ltd, 1995 S.L.T. 211, discussed earlier.
754 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL. 48
enterprise to give rise to a non-delegable duty of care under paragraph
423 of the Restatement.136
The doctrine of non-delegation introduces its own uncertainties. In
particular, if a duty of care is non-delegable only with regard to hazardous
activities,137 the problem of categorising such activities re-emerges. The
English courts have encountered difficulties in achieving a satisfactory
definition,138 and such definitions often involve an assessment of risk
similar to that required in mainstream negligence.139 The test applied in
South African law assesses the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct
by reference to three questions:
(1) Would a reasonable man have foreseen the risk of danger in
consequence of the work he employed the contractor to perform? If so, (2)
would a reasonable man have taken steps to guard against the danger? If so,
(3) were such steps duly taken in the case in question?1*
This test could almost be reformulated to ask whether the risk factor was
such that the defendant was negligent in engaging anyone to do the work.
Thus, once the activity is classified as dangerous, the doctrine comes close
to heightening non-delegation to the level of a guarantee against the
occurrence of harm.
136. Para.423 of the Second Restatement reads: "One who carries on an activity which
threatens a grave risk of serious bodily harm or death unless the instrumentalities used are
carefully constructed and maintained, and who employs an independent contractor to
construct or maintain such instrumentalities, is subject to the same liability for physical harm
caused by the negligence of the contractor in construction or maintaining such instrumen-
talities as though the employer had himself done the work of construction or maintenance".
Another example of para.423 liability is Maloney v. Rath 69 Cal.2d 442 (1968), 40 A.L.R3d 1
(motorist liable for negligence of independent contractor in failing to maintain brakes).
Improperly maintained vehicles were said to create "a grave risk of serious bodily harm or
death".
137. In Burnie Port Authority, supra n.101, at 558-559 the duty was non-delegable when
"the combined effect of the magnitude of the foreseeable risk of an accident happening and
the magnitude of the foreseeable potential injury or damage of an accident does occur is
such that an ordinary person acting reasonably would consider it necessary to exercise
special care or to take special precautions in relation to it".
138. See Honeywiil & Stein Ltd v. Larkin Bros Ltd [1934] 1 K.B. 191 per Slesser LJ at 199:
"If a man does work on or near another's property which involves danger to that property
unless proper care is taken, he is liable to the owners of the property for damage resulting to
it from the failure to take proper care, and is equally liable if, instead of doing the work
himself he procures another, whether agent, servant or otherwise, to do it for him." See also
Bower v. Peate (1876) 1 Q.BX>. 321, and E. McKendrick, "Vicarious Liability and
Independent Contractors—A Re-examination" (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 770-784.
139. In Alcock v. Wraith, The Times 23 Sept. 1991, Neill LJ suggested that the "crucial
question" in such cases is in fact whether the activity involved "some special risk or was it
from its very nature likely to cause damage".
140. Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v. De Valence 1991 1 S.A. 1(A) per
Goldstone AJA at 12.
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VII. WHO IS LIABLE?
In fault-based systems, liability rests with the person who was at fault,
subject to the rule, just discussed, which permits the transference of
negligence. Systems which do not insist on fault are often less accommo-
dating. If strict liability is to be allowed, it is subject to limitations. Only
narrow classes of person can be strictly liable, and the liability of others
depends on a finding of fault. Thus liability under Rylands v. Fletcher is
restricted to the person who owns or controls the land from which the
dangerous substance escapes; and in French law, the presumption of
liability applies only to the gardien, the keeper of the offending object.
The French rule merits further discussion. The relevant point for
ascertaining who is responsible as gardien is, generally speaking the time
of the accident. But there may be difficulties in ascertaining who is the
gardien. Under Article 1384.1 of the Code an owner may rebut the
presumption that he is gardien by establishing that another individual has
the object for the purposes of loan, hire, or even repair. This may lead to a
situation whereby one person is the gardien de la structure and another
gardien du comportement, the former responsible for intrinsic defects and
the latter for defects in handling the object. The key question is the factual
determination as to who has use, control and direction of the object at the
relevant time.141 However, concepts such as use, control and direction are
necessarily imprecise. Two cases illustrate the difficulties.
In Sociiti L'Oxygine liquide v. Bouloux et Lathus,*42 the Socie'te'
L'Oxygene liquide sent a consignment of compressed oxygen by rail. The
metal bottles containing the oxygen were collected from the station by
lorry. On delivery, one of the bottles exploded, injuring two people. The
cause of the explosion could not be ascertained. The final ruling was that
the Soctete' L'Oxygene liquide, not the carrier, remained liable as
retaining la garde de la structure of the oxygen. Control was transferred to
another "only when it is established that all possibility of preventing the
harm which the thing could cause has been appropriately transferred to
the third party".
This decision may be compared with the recent case of Mannessier v.
Sociite Papeteries de l'AA.u3 The operators of a paper mill allowed
employees to take away empty industrial-sized containers for their own
use. One individual, M. Mannessier, took away several. The containers
still held significant traces of a noxious chemical. Accordingly, when M.
Mannessier washed them out, the water system was polluted and fish in a
nearby fish farm were killed. The court rejected M. Mannessier's
141. Starck, Roland and Boyer, op cit., supra n.3, at paras-SOOff.
142. Recutil DaUoi 1960 J. 609. Sec also case note by Tune in 1962 Revue irimestrielle de
droii civil 647-650.
143. Civ.(2) 25 March 1998.
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argument that the paper mill should be presumed responsible under
Article 1384.1. The offending substance had left the mill's keeping before
the damage was caused. The mill was no longer the gardien. Hence it was
liable only if there was fault, on general principles of law.144 The parallels
with Cambridge Water Company are intriguing. Both cases focus on the
actions of the original keeper at the time when control is lost. The French
rules find liability if the keeper has been at fault in the manner in which he
disposed of the substance. The English rules impose strict liability if the
harmful consequences of the disposal are foreseeable. In neither case, on
the facts, is there liability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The great difficulty posed by the application of negligence law, and by the
modern interpretation of the Rylands v. Fletcher rule, is that it places a
heavy burden of proof placed upon the injured party, and the obligation
to adduce what is often detailed technical evidence. When the plaintiff is
in a weaker position than the defendant as regards the obtaining of
evidence, there is a case to be made for transferring the burden of proof. It
is sometimes more realistic to ask the alleged polluter to prove that he was
not negligent than to ask the victim to prove negligence in the
management of someone else's property. The case for strict liability is
strengthened when the risk has been introduced unilaterally by the
defendanL145Conversely, if both parties have participated in the chain of
events, and have had some opportunity to avert the harm, the case is less
persuasive.
At the same time, in many cases involving dangerous activities, no fault
in the moral, as opposed to legal, sense attaches to the defendant's
conduct. Indeed it may often have brought economic or social advantages
to others. The imposition of a regime of heightened liability is justified, in
the case of hot air ballooning for example, because the level of risk
outweighed the benefits. In practice there is often little difference
between the application of fault-based and strict liability rules because a
calculation of risk against benefit typically underpins both the calculus of
risk in negligence and also the categorisation of the activities which are
subject to strict liability.
144. I.e., under Art. 1382 of the Code, discussed in pt IV(a) above.
145. See M. Faure, "Economic Aspects of Environmental Liability: an Introduction"
(1996) European Review of Private Law 85-110 at p.93.
